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Abstract
We note that there is an exception to the general arguments that no fal-
sifiable predictions can be made, on the basis of of presently available data,
by applying the weak anthropic principle (WAP) to the landscape of string
theory. If there are infinitely more vacua in the landscape for one sign of a
parameter than the other, within an anthropicaly allowed range, then under
very weak assumptions about the probability measure one gets a firm predic-
tion favoring that sign of that parameter. It is interesting to note that while
the understanding of the string landscape is evolving, present evidence on the
nature of the landscape allows such an argument to be made, leading to the
conclusion that theWAP favors a negative value for the cosmological constant,
Λ, in contradiction to the result of astronomical observations. The viability of
applying the WAP to string theory then requires that either there are found an
infinite discretum of anthropically allowed vacua for Λ > 0, or the recently
found infinite discretum of solutions for Λ < 0 be reduced to a finite value.
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1 Introduction
Recently it has been argued by ourselves [1, 2, 3, 4] and others that the present
dominant interpretation of the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP), whereby the ex-
istence of life is explained by random selection from an ensemble of universes with
differing properties [5, 6], is by itself not falsifiable, because any predictions made
from it depend on assumptions made about the ensemble of universes and the
probability measure taken on it. There is a great deal of freedom in the choices that
can be made here, and those assumptions determine the expectations for experi-
ments; but they are untestable, in particular because all the other universes in the
supposed ensemble are unobservable [3, 4].
These considerations are the focus of present interest because of the claims that
the WAP can be applied to the “landscape” [1] of string theory [7, 8]. According
to recent results, the landscape consists of an infinite set of discrete vacua, which
are argued to be different possible quasistable ground states for string theory [9,
10, 11, 12]. These include on the order of N+ = 10
500 flux compactifications which
appear compatible with 3+1 non-compact dimensions and a positive cosmological
constant Λ [9]. This landscape of possibilities leads to a vast number of different
predictions for post standardmodel physics [9], rather than a single prediction that
can be verified or disproved. This has led to worries that string theory fails to be
predictive.
Combining these considerations, it appears at first that the WAP places no con-
straints on string theory because it is expected that the Landscape will include
many versions of local physics that will allow life to exist; consequently the WAP
can always be fulfilled in any ensemble of universes where most of the possibilities
of the Landscape are realised. The project of combining the WAP with the land-
scape of string theory, as proposed in [7, 8], then has been argued to be untestable.
In reply, it has been proposed that the theory makes exactly one prediction,
which is that the sign of the spatial curvature be negative [8, 13]. This in principle
could allow disproof of most versions of the theory, were the scalar curvature mea-
sured to be positive. However there will for the foreseeable future be considerable
uncertainties that will prevent many from accepting this kind of data as knock-out
disproof of either the landscape or the idea of an ensemble of universes, even if the
observations come out on the side of positively curved spatial sections.1
In this comment we point out there is another important exception to the con-
clusion that the combination of the WAP with the string landscape is untestable.
In spite of the general difficulties, we show that there are possible distributions of
vacua that allow an argument based on the WAP to be made which leads to a pre-
diction which is stable under a large number of choices for the probability measure
1 The best present value of the spatial curvature parameter from the combined astronomical data
has shifted from Ωk = 1.02± 0.02 [14], marginally indicating positively curved spatial sections, to
Ωk = 1.003± 0.010 [15], consistent with positive or negative values.
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on the ensemble of universes.
One case in which this can occur is if there are a finite number of anthropically
allowed vacua for one sign ofΛ, but an infinite discrete set of anthropically allowed
vacua for the other sign. For example, suppose that there is an infinite discretum
of anthropically allowed vacua for Λ > 0 and only a finite discretum for Λ < 0. We
can then argue that under a large set of possible choices for probability weights the
theory will predict Λ > 0. This is because there would then be two discrete sets
of universes where life may be possible: one, S− (with Λ < 0), is finite, and the
other, S+ (with Λ > 0) is infinite. If we follow the logic of the WAP argument by
choosing randomly from the infinite set S ≡ S+
⋃
S− which is the union of them
(with Λ taking all values), there is vanishing probability that we will end up in the
finite subset S− of negative cosmological constant universes. Thus, in this case,
we would predict that Λ > 0. This would be most gratifying as that is what is
observed [16, 17].
At present the study of the landscape is evolving, and it is too soon to draw
definitive conclusions of this kind. But, for what it may be worth, it can be pointed
out that at present the situation is the reverse of that just sketched. There are at
present claimed to be a large, if finite discretum of vacua with values of the cos-
mological constant that are positive but less than anthropic bounds [9]. There is
even a conjecture that the set of anthropically allowed vacua consistent with Λ > 0
is bounded by a finite number [12]. Thus, at present, the evidence is that the car-
dinality of the Λ > 0, anthropically allowed discretum, which we may call, N+, is
large, but finite.
At the same time, the present evidence is that the set of string vacua with neg-
ative cosmological constant is actually countably infinite [10, 11]. As is shown in
[10], the number of string vacua appears to diverge as Λ → 0 from below. In the
vacua studied in [10] there is a condition that the compactification volume also
be large, so the number anthropically allowed will be a proper subset and, per-
haps even finite. However in [11] evidence is found for an infinite set of additional
negative Λ compactifications, including some whose numbers diverge within fi-
nite ranges of macroscopic parameters. At present, our understanding is that not
enough is known about this set to knowwhether all but a finite set can be excluded
on anthropic grounds. Thus the present situation (which may certainly change) is
that the best estimate for the number of negative cosmological constant anthropi-
cally allowed vacua, N−, is
N− =∞. (1)
If further studies should confirm these estimates, then there would be impor-
tant consequences for the viability of the landscape approach to string phenomenol-
ogy. This is because the combination of the results and conjectures in the papers
[10, 11, 12] lead, if correct, to the conclusion that the weak anthropic principle im-
plies that the cosmological constant will be negative, which is in contradiction to
the astronomically determined value [16, 17]. Consequently, if the present situ-
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ation turns out to be correct[22], we will have to conclude that either the string
theory landscape does not describe nature, or the Anthropic style of argument
whereby the existence of life is explained by random selection from an ensemble
of universes cannot be valid (perhaps because the hypothesized ensemble of uni-
verses does not in fact exist). But this is then problematic for both understandings,
because on the one hand the landscape of string theory is claimed to be the natural
setting for applying the anthropic style of argument [7], and on the other, anthropic
arguments seem to be the only way to get reasonably unique physical predictions
out of the landscape of string theory. If the combination does not work, as we ar-
gue here is implied by the current best understandings of the landscape, then both
components are on weak ground.
The purpose of this note is to make this argument more carefully.
2 The weak anthropic principle
Here is a standard version of the weak anthropic principle [18]. We posit that there
is an actual ensemble E of universes ui, or of expanding universe domains in a
larger universe, which is a discrete set; we live in one of the expanding universe
domains in the ensemble. They may, for example, have been produced by eternal
inflation [19], or other mechanisms. We may take the number of actual expanding
universe domains NU to be arbitrarily large, or countably infinite. On E there is a
measure fi which is proportional to the probability for the universe ui to contain
intelligent life. If it is impossible for life to exist in a universe2 ui, then fi = 0. There
is then a subensemble L ⊂ E of universes where intelligent life is possible.
In some versions, including those associated with the principle of mediocrity [20],
fi is proportional to something like “the number of civilizations” likely to exist in
the universe ui. In other versions, fi has a constant non-zero value if intelligent life
is possible in ui.
We may be interested in the value of an observable, O whose value in the uni-
verse ui is Oi. According to the weak anthropic principle its expectation value is
given by
< O >=
∑′
iOifi∑′
i fi
(2)
where the sum indicated by
∑′
i means sum over all the universes in the ensemble
L where intelligent life is possible. Alternatively, let Q be some property that a
universe may or may not have. Those universe which have the property live in an
ensemble EQ. Let u
′
i denote all ui such that ui ∈ EQ ∩ L. Then the probability that
2From here on we use ‘universe’ as shorthand for ‘universe or expanding universe domain’.
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Q is true in a typical randomly chosen universe with intelligent life is
PQ =
∑
u′
i
fi∑′
i fi
(3)
The reason why it is sometimes argued that the weak anthropic principle implies
directly no predictions is that these observables depend crucially on the choices
made of the weights fi. However, given information about the fi, some predictions
are possible, as we shall now see.
3 Anthropic constraints on the cosmological constant
A famous argument of Weinberg tells us that there is a maximum value of the
cosmological constant Λ compatible with the existence of galaxies [6]. Since it is
believed that stars form in galaxies, and planets providing viable habitats for life
circle around stars, we take this value, which we call Λ+ as the limiting value
necessary for intelligent life.
There is, so far as we know, no cosmological or astronomical reason that life is
not compatible with zero cosmological constant. There can therefor be no astro-
nomical reason life is not compatible with a small negative cosmological constant,
but there will be a lower limit Λ− to the negative values of Λ compatible with intel-
ligent life, because all universes with a negative cosmological constant recollapse,
and too negative a value for Λwill imply extremely short life times for the universe
before they recollapse, not allowing the extended times needed for the evolution
of intelligent life .
There seems no reason why life is not roughly as probable in a member of the
string theory landscape with slightly negative value of Λ than slightly positive. It
is true that for the positive Λmembers of the discretum, supersymmetry is always
broken at the level of the effective supergravity description, whereas for the nega-
tive Λmembers sometimes it is broken at that level and sometimes it is preserved.
It is also possible that supersymmetry breaking is necessary for life. But even if
that were the case, there is a general expectation that even in a world governed
by a string theory compactification with N = 1 supersymmetry, supersymmetry
can break at a much lower scale. Indeed, a common expectation has been that a
phenomenologically realistic string theory would be compactified with N = 1 su-
persymmetry, leading to a low energy phenomenology given by the MSSM (mini-
mal supersymmetric standard model), and that supersymmetry would be broken
spontaneously at the weak scale. There seems no reason to believe that this is more
or less likely for members of the discretum with slightly positive Λ than slightly
negative Λ.
The main relevent differences between the two cases, from the point of view
of the weak anthropic principle, is that according to current understandings of the
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landscape of string theory, there is a finite set of the slightly positive Λ elements of
the discretum, while the slightly negative Λ discretum is an infinite set.
We may then reason in the following way. Consider an actually existing en-
semble of universes which includes our own universe, which is selected from the
ensemble because it allows life to exist. Let us define the function f(Λ) to be the
anthropic weight given to a universe in the ensemble with cosmological constant
Λ, averaging over all other parameters. That is, it is the probability that intelligent
life will occur in that universe. We require that f(Λ) be a smooth, normalizable
function such that if Λi is the cosmological constant of the universe ui,
fi = f(Λi)wi (4)
Here wi is a weight that accounts for everything in the properties of the universe
that affect the existence of intelligent life, except the cosmological constant. As-
suming the existence of this function dependent only on Λ is equivalent to assum-
ing that the probability for life to occur is a separable function, so that we can
consider the dependence on Λ separately from the dependence on other parame-
ters3. This may not be true for all circumstances, but is probably true for universes
close to ours in the ensemble of possibilities, that is, those with properties similar
to that in which we live. In any case this is the assumption made by Weinberg
in his analysis [6], and by most papers that followed that one. We will see what
the result is on this basis, taken as a first approximation that allows an analysis of
the probabilities. Further analyses could look into weakening this restriction; we
doubt that will change the result.
For universes within the ensembleL of universes with life, we can assume there
are minimum and maximum values wmin and wmax such that
∀ui ∈ L, 0 < wmin ≤ wi ≤ wmax. (5)
That is, given all other factors, the expectation for life does indeed depend crucially
on the cosmological constant; but that dependence is not infinitely sensitive.
There are many details that go into the wi whose effects on the chance for in-
telligent life are difficult to estimate with present knowledge, such as whether su-
persymmetry breaking happens at the Planck scale or lower, or whether indeed
supersymmetry breaking is necessary for life. But these details are not crucial; all
we need is the condition (5).
We may also impose very weak conditions on f(Λ) coming from our knowl-
edge of these anthropic conditions. We define the ratio
r = lim
ǫ→0+
∫ ǫ
Λ−
f(Λ) dΛ
∫ Λ+
ǫ
f(Λ) dΛ
. (6)
3For a discussion of parametrisation of universes in relation to the anthropic principle, see [3].
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As discussed above, there seems no reason that a slightly positive value of the
cosmological constant should be infinitely more friendly to life than a slightly neg-
ative value. We then propose it is reasonable to assume
• A: f(Λ) is smooth and
∫ Λ+
Λ−
dΛf(Λ) = 1.
• B: r is a non-zero, but finite number.
The first condition gives a normalization for f(Λ) and implies that f(Λ) is
bounded. The second says that the conditions for intelligent life do not favor one
sign of the cosmological constant over another sign more than can be expressed
by a finite, non-zero ratio. Together with the first condition it implies that f(Λ) is
bounded separately for positive and negative Λ.
Given that there is very unlikely to be an anthropic reason to favor very small
positive values of Λ over very small negative values, these seem reasonable as-
sumptions that will in fact necessarily be fulfilled without implying any further
restrictions on the physics considered. But they are the specific assumptions we
will need in what follows, and we label them as such. In effect they explicate the
anthropic requirements that have to be fulfilled in relation to the values of Λ. Fur-
ther analyses could look at weakening these conditions.
4 A prediction from combining string theory with the
weak anthropic principle
Given the definitions made above, we can compute the probability that the cosmo-
logical constant is strictly greater than some positive value ǫ < Λ+ on the basis of the
properties of the string theory landscape. Suppose that selection of the universe
in which we live takes place in an ensemble associated with such a landscape. Let
i(ǫ,Λ+) be the set of values i such that ǫ ≤ Λi ≤ Λ+ and i(Λ−,Λ+) be the set of
values i such that Λ− ≤ Λi ≤ Λ+. Then on the basis of the present understandings
of the landscape of string theory, summarized above, we argue as follows:
PΛ>ǫ =
∑′
i(ǫ,Λ+)
fi
∑′
i(Λ−,Λ+)
fi
(7)
For any finite value of ǫ much smaller than the anthropic limit Λ+ the numerator
is a finite sum, albeit over a large number of elements. But the denominator is an
infinite sum. Given the conditions A and B we have assumed for f it follows that
each term in the sums in the numerator and denominator is finite, positive and
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bounded. Then, for any positive ǫmuch smaller than Λ+ we have
4.
Λ+ ≫ ǫ > 0⇒ PΛ>ǫ = 0 (9)
Alternatively we can compute the expectation value of Λ. From (2) we have
< Λ >=
∑′
i fiΛi∑′
i fi
(10)
It follows from our assumptions plus the results on the string landscape [10, 11]
that
< Λ > ≤ 0. (11)
This is because there are infinitely more universes in (10) with Λ ≤ 0 than for
strictly positive values.
These predictions disagreewith current astronomical observations, which show
that Λ > 0 at present [16, 17], with the observations being compatible with the
‘dark energy’ causing the observed acceleration being a cosmological constant
[21].5 Thus, one can say that given the assumptions A and B together with the
current results on the string theory landscape, by using the WAP we reach a pre-
diction that is falsified by current observations. This is the result claimed in the
introduction.
We can also consider the probability Pcompatible that string theory is in the finite
set, conjectured by Acharya and Douglas [12] to be compatible with all current
observations. Given that this is a finite subset of string vacua, and that there is an
infinite set of string vacua not compatible with current observations, one reaches
the conclusion by similar reasoning that
Pcompatible = 0. (12)
This reinforces the conclusion reached above. Similarly, we can consider the pos-
sibility that there is a continuous infinite set of zero cosmological constant, super-
symmetric vacua.6. This would also strengthen the conclusion.
4Here is the demonstration
PΛ>ǫ <
wmax
wmin
∑′
i(ǫ,Λ+)
f(Λi)
∑′
i(Λ
−
,Λ+)
f(Λi)
= 0. (8)
This vanishes because the f(Λ) are bounded, so the expression is a ratio of a finite sum of positive
bounded terms to an infinite sum of positive bounded terms.
5Even if the observations eventually show ‘dark energy’ varies with time and so is not a cos-
mological constant, the Landscape argument predicts there will indeed be a negative cosmological
constant! This is not what is observed.
6David Gross, Private communication.
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5 Conclusions
We have found that, while it is difficult generally to extract falsifiable predictions
from a combination of the WAP and the string landscape, there are exceptions in
which the statistics of the string vacua are weighed so heavily towards one range
of parameters, that there are predictions which are stable under a wide range of
choices of probability weights. As we have seen here, the present data on the land-
scape, as of this date, allows such an argument to be made with regard to the sign
of the cosmological constant, and that prediction happens to be in disagreement
with observation.
It may very well be that this situation changes when the landscape is better
explored. There are four basic possibilities, depending on whether N+ or N− are
finite or infinite. If both are finite or both are infinite, it may be difficult to get a firm
prediction which does not depend on otherwise untestable assumptions about the
probability weights. But if one is finite and the other infinite, as is the case with
our present understandings, we can expect a firm prediction, one of which would
be right, in that it agrees with the data, and the other wrong - it would indeed be
falsified. The latter is what is in fact implied by the current status of understanding
of the landscape.
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